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COMMENT
"ISN'T THAT OUR SOFTWARE?"
Timothy Haslach*
I. INTRODUCTION
Today's P.C. and related software are designed for ease of use,
hence the term "user friendly" has developed to describe such
software. This ease of use allows an employee of a company, for
example, to write reports, based upon volumes of data, in a fraction
of the time required by conventional means. Once such a report
program has been created by an employer or an employee, it can be
used repeatedly and can be modified to meet alternative needs. Re-
alization of increased productivity may lead an employee to attempt
to sell such a program to competitors or to businesses similar to his
employer's. Alternatively, an employer may take a copy of the em-
ployee's program and sell it to another company without compen-
sating the employee-author.
In either of the above situations, the key issue concerns the
ownership of the employee-developed program. This comment dis-
cusses various factors associated with the ownership of software
written in the workplace.
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
The P.C. is comprised of four basic components: the keyboard,
the central processing unit (C.P.U.), the monitor and the printer.'
There are other components which a programmer may use, but
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1. Keyboards, which resemble the keyboard of a typewriter, are used to enter strings
of commands or data into the computer. When the user presses the keys on the keyboard, the
keyboard translates the keystrokes into a series of on and off signals which the C.P.U. can
read. Thus, when the "A" key is pressed, the keyboard generates a series of on(s) and off(s)
(or zeros and ones) which the C.P.U. can read as an "A." Once the signal is acknowledged
by the C.P.U., it may send a signal to a television like monitor or a printer where the "A" will
either be displayed or printed.
The C.P.U. is the brain of the computer system where programs of all types are read in a
manner similar to that in which the keyboard signals are read. Once a program is loaded into
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these four make up the basic components needed to run most
software.
A computer program is "[a]n ordered set of instructions which
sets forth a process to be accomplished automatically in a com-
puter."2  Software is "[t]he physical embodiment of a program."3
This physical embodiment is usually in the form of a floppy disk or
magnetic tape. Software is also a general term relating to the "doc-
umentation procedures, forms and other soft or intangible informa-
tion connected with the use of a computer program."
4
There are many types of computer programs and software used
in the business world. Among these programs are system operation
programs5 and application programs.6
III. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR COMPUTOR PROGRAMS
Employees who write a computer program may attempt to
protect their works through copyright laws. In the past it has not
been clear whether copyright protection was extended to computer
programs. This section shall review the development of copyright
protection and its application to computer software.
Initially, when computer programmers sought copyright pro-
tection for their works, they were faced with problems based upon
the prerequisites for copyrighting a work. When computer pro-
grams were first created, only the intelligible source code of a pro-
the Random Access Memory, or RAM, this reading process will constantly tell the C.P.U.
how to react to commands inputed by the keyboard or by other programs.
See generally, TIME-LIFE BOOKS, UNDERSTANDING COMPUTERS, COMPUTER BASICS,
at 32 (1985) [cited herein as COMPUTER BASICS].
2. M. DUNCAN & J. A. DAVIDSON, ADVANCED LEGAL STRATEGIES FOR BUYING
AND SELLING COMPUTER SoFrwARE, at 13 (1986) [hereinafter cited as DAVIDSON].
3. DAVIDSON, at 13.
4. Id. at 13.
5. A system operating program is a"... collection of programs which are essential or
useful to the operation of the hardware (the hardware being the computer components them-
selves)." DAVIDSON, at 14.
6. An application program is a program which, by the aid of the system operating
programs or language, can perform pre-designed tasks such as amortizing loans or balancing
a checkbook. When a computer programmer creates an application program, it is stored in a
form known as source code. Source code is the text of the program which can be read or
edited without the aid of a machine. The source code must be translated into a code that the
computer can read, known as object code. Object code, unlike source code, cannot be read or
edited without the aid of a machine.
The process of translating source code into object code is performed by a sophisticated
program known as a compiler. Most programs which are marketed to the public are com-
piled and stored in object code. This allows the programmer to protect the lines of com-
mands, or code, from being copied by another programmer and sold as a competing product.
ISN'T THAT OUR SOFTWARE?
gram could be copyrighted.7 This allowed the author of a work to
protect the actual source code of his program, but it also allowed
others to see how the program worked, and to copy it for their own
use. Thus, it became apparent that programmers were only pro-
tected if their works could be copyrighted in object code, which is
unintelligible without the aid of a machine. This problem was rem-
edied, in part, by the 1976 Copyright Act,' but only to the degree
that the definition of intelligible work was expanded to include that
work which could be comprehended "with the aid of a machine or
device." 9 While this provided some protection, other challenges to
the copyrightablity of computer programs developed because such
programs were not expressly mentioned as protected works under
the 1976 Act.10
The omission of computer programs from the 1976 Act
brought much criticism upon Congress and prompted the National
Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyright Works
(CONTU) to recommend that the President and Congress amend
the 1976 Act. The Commission proposed that the Act be amended
so "... . as to make it explicit that computer programs, to the extent
that they embody an author's original creation, are proper subject
matter for a copyright."11 Congress took the recommendations
under consideration and enacted the 1980 amendment to the U.S.
Copyright Act.12 As a result of this amendment, computer pro-
grams were finally recognized as proper subject matter for copy-
right and afforded some protection.
Interestingly, the legislative history of the 1976 Act reveals
that the 1980 amendment may not have been necessary in order to
protect consumer programs." The legislative history reveals that
while Congress may not have expressly included computer pro-
7. Copyright Act, 1909, Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320; 35 Stat. 1075 (as amended,
1947) [hereinafter referred to as "1909 Act"].
8. Copyright Act, 1976, Public Law 94-553 1976 (effective January 1, 1978; current
version 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq.) [hereinafter referred to as "1976 Act"].
9. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
10. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-118.
11. Goldstein, Infringement of Copyright in Computer Programs, 47 U. Prrr. L. REv,
1119, at 1123. (1986) [hereinafter referred to as "Goldstein"].
12. Public Law 96-517, § 10(a), 94 Stat. 3028 (1980). See, Goldstein, at 1123.
13. The House Report States:
The history of copyright law has been one of gradual expansion in the types of
works accorded protection, and the subject matter affected by this expansion
has fallen into two general categories. In the first, scientific discoveries and
technological developments that never existed before. In some of these cases
the new expressive forms - electronic music, filmstrips, and computer pro-
grams - could be regarded as an extension of copyrightable subject matter
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grams under the umbrella of copyright protection, the Act was in-
tended to cover these forms of expression as they developed. This
intention is consistent with the responsibility of Congress to legis-
late copyright and patent laws: "[t]o promote the progress of sci-
ence and useful arts, by securing for a limited time to authors and
inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries." 
14
Unfortunately, the 1980 amendment did not solve all of the
problems faced by computer programmers in securing copyright
protection. This became apparent in the landmark case of Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 15 which dealt with the
system operating programs which ran the Apple Computer. De-
fendant Franklin had copied some of the program source code and
some object codes from plaintiff. Defendant argued that the pro-
gram is part of the machine not meant to be communicated to peo-
ple in a manner protected under copyright law. On appeal, the
district court rejected defendant's argument and held that the 1976
Act had been written by Congress to cover operating systems, as
well as other programs. The court concluded that there was no dif-
ference between the medium of a message and the message itself.
Thus, even if the aid of a machine is needed to understand the form
of the message that is communicated, copyright law still applied.
In light of Apple and the 1980 amendment to the 1976 Act, a
computer program, be it in intelligible source code or unintelligible
object code, could be copyrighted.
IV. OWNERSHIP OF THE COPYRIGHT
Having established that compiled programs can be protected
under copyright law, in whom does the ownership of the copyright
vest? The 1976 Act provides that the copyright in a work initially
vests in the author or authors of the work.1 6 The 1976 Act further
states that the authors of a joint work are co-owners of the copy-
right of the work. 7
Given that the ownership of a copyright vests with the author,
a problem arises in the situation where the author is not the person
who created the work. Consider, for example, the employee who
Congress had already intended to protect, and were thus considered copyright-
able from the outset without the need of new legislation.
H. Rep. 94-1476, 94th Cong. 2d Ses., at 51 (1976).
14. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
15. 714 F.2d 1240 (3rd Cir. 1983).
16. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a).
17. Id.
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writes a computer program at his place of work. The 1976 Act
states that in the case of a "work made for hire," the employer, or
the person for whom the work was prepared, is deemed the "au-
thor." 8 Thus, if a program is written under the guidance and at
the behest of the employer, the employer may claim authorship of
that program under the "works made for hire" doctrine of the 1976
Act.19 In addition, the employer who commissions an independent
contractor to create a program, may be also be deemed as the au-
thor of that program.2
However, the fact that an employer hires a person to create a
program or to modify a program for the employer's use, does not
mean that the work automatically falls under the definition of
"works made for hire."' 21 Where the "work" of an employee or in-
dependent contractor meets the requirement listed under the 1976
Act, then the work is labeled as "works made for hire," and "un-
less the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instru-
ment signed by them... ,"22 the employer is deemed the owner of
the copyright.
The application of the "works made for hire" section of the
1976 Act is evidenced in Samet & Wells, Inc. v. Shalom Toy Co,
Inc. ,23 where a toy manufacturer employed an artist to create de-
18. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b).
19. Id.
20. However, this may not always be the case. In Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow
Dental Laboratories, Inc-, 609 F. Supp 1307 (E.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd, 797 F.2d 1222 (1986), the
court found that the contributions by the employer were not significant enough to raise the
fiction of the employer being the author. Here, though, there was also a prior agreement as to
the ownership of the programs.
21. The 1976 Act defines "works made for hire" as:
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employ-
ment; or (2) a work ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a
collective work, as a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation,
as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as
answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a
written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work
made for hire. For the purpose of the foregoing sentence, a "supplementary
work" is a work prepared for publication as a secondary adjunct to a work by
another author for the purpose of introducing, concluding, illustrating, ex-
plaining, revising, commenting upon, or assisting in the use of the other work,
such as forewards, afterwords, pictorial illustrations, maps, charts, tables, edi-
torial notes, musical arrangements, answer material for tests, bibliographies,
appendixes, and indexes, and an "instructional text" is a literary, pictorial,
graphic work prepared for publication and with the purpose of use in system-
atic instructional activities.
17 U.S.C. § 101.
22. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b).
23. 429 F. Supp. 895 (D.C. N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 578 F.2d 1369 (1978).
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signs for a toy turtle. The designs were completed and the artist
was paid in full. The artist later presented the same designs to an-
other manufacturer who produced the same toy. The original em-
ployer brought suit and the court determined that absent express
contractual reservations of copyright in the artist, title to the copy-
right is presumed to be in the person at whose instance and expense
the work was created. The court expressly stated that this pre-
sumption applies to independent contractors as well as employees.24
In contrast, in Siegel v. National Periodical Publications, Inc.,25
a comic strip creator revised and expanded his strip at the request of
the publisher who had purchased the strip. The court held the revi-
sions of the strip did not constitute a "work for hire" since the doc-
trine is only applicable when the employee's work is "produced at
the instance and expense of the employer." 6 The court's conclu-
sion stemmed from the fact that the comic strip was created prior to
the employment relationship and the revisions were only made to
accommodate the magazine format.
Under the "works made for hire" definition in the 1976 Act,
the work prepared by an employee must be within the scope of his
employment to constitute a "work made for hire."'2 7 The difficulty
in applying this definition lies in determining the meaning of
"within the scope of his or her employment."2"
In Scherr v. Universal Match Corp.,z9 a work is created "within
the scope of employment" if the employer possesses the right to
direct and supervise the manner in which the work is being per-
formed. The court will look to the following factors to determine
whether or not the works are within the scope of employment: a)
whose instances, expense, time and facilities are being used; and b)
the nature and amount of compensation that the employee receives
for the work.3"
Using the Scherr test, the court's rationale and decision in
Siegel becomes clearer. Because the comic strip was not created at
the instance, expense, and time of the employer, and hence the facil-
ities used were those of the artist, the work did not fall within the
24. Id. at 902.
25. 508 F.2d 909 (C.A. N.Y. 1974).
26. Id. at 914.
27. 17 U.S.C. § 101, which states in part:
A work made for hire is - (1) a work prepared by an employee within the
scope of his or her employment.
28. Id.
29. 417 F.2d 497 (C.A. N.Y. 1969), cerL denied, 397 U.S. 936.
30. Id., at 502.
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definition of the "scope of employment." Although the artist re-
ceived compensation for the comic strip, it was for work created
prior to the employment relationship.
Applying the aforementioned cases to computer programs, it is
apparent that, if a program is commissioned by an employer or
other person and the work as a whole is created at the instance of
the employer, unless there is an express contractual agreement stat-
ing otherwise and signed by both parties, the employer is the owner
of the copyright. However, the modification of an existing program
to suit an employer's needs, does not constitute a "work made for
hire" and the program creator may retain ownership of the copy-
right. In addition, the programmer can rebut the initial presump-
tion that the copyright of a computer program is owned by the
employer, if the programmer can show the program was not created
within the scope of the employment.
Another interpretation of "works made for hire" is found in
the landmark case of Aldon Accessories, Ltd. v. Spiegle.Y1 The works
in Aldon were handmade figures made for an American company by
workers in the Far East. Aldon, the American company, registered
their copyright for these works and brought suit against Spiegle for
infringement of their copyright. The court determined that
although the figures were designed and produced by non-regular
employees (i.e. independent contractors) of Aldon, the supervision
and direction of Aldon was sufficient to establish the works as
"works made for hire." .Thus, under the 1976 Act, the figures con-
sisted of "works prepared for an employer within the scope of his or
her employment."32
A concise wording of current law regarding "works made for
hire" is contained in Aldon's jury instructions:
A work for hire is a work prepared by what the law calls an
employee working within the scope of his employment. What
that means is, a person acting under the direction and supervi-
sion of the hiring author, at the hiring author's instance and ex-
pense. It does not matter whether the for hire creator is an
employee in the sense of having a regular job with the hiring
author. What matters is whether the hiring author caused the
work to be made and exercised the right to direct and supervise
the creation.33
31. 738 F.2d 548 (C.A. N.Y. 1984), cerL denied, 105 S. Ct. 38.
32. Id. at 553.
33. Id. at 551. But see, Easter Seal Society for Crippled Children and Adults of Louisi-
ana, Inc. v. Playboy Enterprises, 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir 1987), where the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit recently rejected the holding in Aldon. Here the court held that
19881
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The court in Picture Music v. Bourne 34 established a seven-part
test to determine when a "work for hire" vests the copyright in the
employer:
1) existence of an arrangement going beyond assignor-assignee
relationship prior to the undertaking of the work; 2) payment of
wages or other remuneration; 3) right of the putative employer to
direct and supervise the manner in which the work is performed;
4) existence of an express contract for hire, especially when the
author is to devote his or her services exclusively to the em-
ployer; 5) regular working hours; 6) the fact that the work was
created in whole or in part at the putative employer's place of
business; and 7) the putative employer has the right to suspend
or dismiss the creator.35
As previously mentioned, absent express contractual reserva-
tion of copyright in the author, title to the copyright is presumed to
be in the person at whose instance and expense the work was done.
However, an employee may include a provision in an employment
contract which reserves to the employee the copyright in the work.
In Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratories,
Inc. ,36 an employer agreed that the programs written by the
programmer for a dental laboratory would remain in the designer-
programmer's ownership. Although the employer defined the infor-
mation which he wanted to retrieve with the aid of the program, the
Whelan court found these mere specification insufficient to give the
employer ownership rights to the program. The court further held
that the employer was unable to assert rights to copyright owner-
ship because of the agreement made prior to the creation of the
program. Once an employer and employee expressly contract for
ownership of a copyright in material to be created, such a right can-
not be asserted later by the party who relinquished it.
The court in Picture Music37 set out the criteria for determin-
ing whether a program created by an employee for the employer's
sole use on the employer's computer and without the instance or
guidance of the employer constitutes a "work for hire." The court
stated that when such works are created during the employee's off-
hours, it is likely that the assignor-assignee relationship does not
only employees and independent contractors who fulfill the requirements of 17 U.S.C.
§ 101(2) can be "for hire" under the 1976 Act.
34. 314 F. Supp. 640 (D.C. N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 457 F.2d 1214, cert. denied, 409 U.S.
997.
35. 314 F. Supp. at 646.
36. 609 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
37. 314 F. Supp. at 646.
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exist. 38 Because the work is created by the employee for the em-
ployee's use, there was no agreement that the employee create such
a program for the benefit of the employer. Furthermore, because
the employee is not being paid wages by the employer to create such
a program,39 the putative employer does not have the right to direct
or supervise the manner in which an employee creates such
programs.
On the other hand, if the employee had expressly agreed to
devote all of his programming services to the employer, any pro-
gram created thereafter is considered a "work[s] made for hire."'
Hence, in this situation, the copyright would rest with the
employer.
V. POST-EMPLOYMENT ISSUES
If an employee's work was created within his "scope of em-
ployment," and the employee subsequently terminates the employ-
ment relationship, would future use of the work in a post-
employment situation be considered a compilation of prior works?
In other words, when a programmer leaves his place of employment
and takes copies of his compiled programs, and subsequently makes
alterations to those programs, would his attempts to sell them on
the software market infringe any copyrights vested in the prior
employer?
In Collier Engineering Co. v. United Correspondence Schools
Co. ,1 the court held that an employee is not barred from making a
new compilation from the original source nor from making use of
experience and information gained in past employment. Thus, Col-
lier together with Seigel suggests that a programmer-employee who
modifies previously written programs within the "scope of employ-
ment" for use by an employer, may create a new compilation of that
program and become the owner of the new program's copyright.
This result is justified in light of the responsibilty of Congress to
create copyright laws to protect the true author in order to promote
or foster developments in science and art.42
38. Id.
39. This may be complicated if the employee creates the program during regular work
hours since during that time period he would be receiving wages from the employer.
40. 314 F. Supp. 640.
41. 94 F. 152 (C.C. N.Y. 1899).
42. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
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VI. IDEAS AND EXPRESSIONS
An important issue to consider regarding computer software
and copyright law is the fact that copyright law will protect the
manner in which an idea is expressed, yet it does not protect the
idea itself. "There is no question that copyright does not protect
the underlying ideas and algorithms in a program. The question is
where to draw the line between "expression" and "ideas."'4 3 In stat-
ing this, Davidson explains that a programmer may choose several
ways to express an idea by simply using one of the various algo-
rithms to express the same result. The choice of algorithm to
achieve the result can be called the "programmer's style."
Problems may occur when there are only a limited number of ways
to achieve the desired result for any given program.
Davidson's best example of limited programs is the basic input
and output program. A basic input and output program is one in
which input-output is tailored to specific components, and as a re-
sult, can be written in only a finite number of ways. In these in-
stances the programmer is able to copyright the work, but is unable
to preclude others from writing similar programs, unless they are
copied verbatim. In other words, if there are a limited number of
ways to express an idea, without some flexibility, a programmer
could hold a virtual monopoly over all basic input-output programs
for similar systems.' This result would appear contrary to the gen-
eral purpose of copyright law.4"
At first glance, Davidson's conclusion appears to differ with
the holding of Apple v. Franklin.46 However, in Apple, the type of
program involved was neither short nor limited in alternative ways
of writing the operating program.
Other cases have considered the dichotomy between "ideas"
and "expressions" in computer programs. In Apple Computer v.
Formula International Inc.,a the court considered whether copy-
ing the instructions controlling the internal operations of a com-
puter may be given copyright protection. The program was based
upon an operating language that did not limit the ways in which the
same idea could be achieved. The court determined that these pro-
43. DAVIDSON, at 99.
44. DAVIDSON, at 100.
45. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
46. 714 F.2d 1240.
47. 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984). See also P. Lamoree, Expanding Copyrights in
Software: The Struggle to Define "Expression" Begins, 4 S.C. COMP. & H. TECH. L. Y. 49
(1988).
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grams were entitled to such protection despite the contentions that
they were only ideas or processes (as opposed to expressions), which
directly interfaced with the computer and not the user. The court
found no distinction in the 1976 Act which would prevent copy-
right laws from protecting programs designed to interface with a
user as opposed to those which simply managed the machine.
VI. USEFUL ARTICLES
Based upon these decisions, there appear to be limits to the
protection of copyrightable programs. Under the "useful articles"
doctrine, if "an article ha[s] intrinsic utilitarian function that is not
merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey infor-
mation,"" such an article is deemed to be a useful article, and such
articles or any part thereof 9 are not copyrightable. 50
Although the "useful articles" doctrine has few practical appli-
cations to copyright law regarding computer programs, it has been
used in the arguments of such cases as Apple v. Franklin and Apple
v. Formula. In both cases, the defendants, Franklin and Formula,
asserted that the use of programs to run internal operations of a
computer system and the "useful articles" built into a work are
copyrightable (i.e. the computer hardware). It was also argued that
these specific programs were not meant to be communicated to the
user, but rather to be utilized by the hardware or internal memory
of the system.
In both cases, the courts did not allow these arguments to sub-
vert the protection of copyrightable programs. Although both
courts did not directly mention the "useful articles" doctrine in
their holdings, and instead relied on an interpretation of the 1976
Act, this does not preclude a later court from holding to the
contrary.
VII. REGISTRATION
Once ownership of copyright is established, it is to the advan-
tage of the owner to register the copyright. The registration of a
copyright is essential if the owner is to bring a suit for infringe-
48. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
49. Id.
50. See generally, Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2nd
Cir. 1985) (utilitarian articles which do not possess artistic features that can be separated
from their utilitarian dimension are not copyrightable); Norris Industries, Inc. v. Interna-
tional Tel. & Tel. Corp., 696 F.2d 918 (C.A. Fla. 1983), rehearing denied, 703 F.2d 582, cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct 78, (wire-spoked wheel covers are useful articles in that their artistic and
utilitarian uses are one).
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ment.51 According to Davidson, the 1976 Act encourages registra-
tion because it grants the copyright owner five major advantages.5 2
First, an advantage to registration is that it entitles the copy-
right owner to collect attorney's fees in an infringement action com-
mencing after the date of registration or, if the work is registered in
the first three months of publication, after the date of publication. 3
This advantage is especially important if an injunction is sought. If
an injunction is granted, but without an award of attorney's fees,
most owners would be deterred from bringing future infringement
actions.
Second, registration of a copyright creates prima facie evidence
of ownership. 4 The existence of a certificate of registration will ac-
celerate the granting of a preliminary injuction or procurement of a
temporary restraining order against the infringing party.
Third, the earlier one applies for and receives the certification
of registration, the earlier that party is able to file an infringement
action. Because the process of certification takes a fair amount of
time, the action will be delayed until certification is acquired and
thus may not be pursued under the 1976 Act.55 Thus, advanced
registration would clearly benefit the author in his claims for
infringement.
Fourth, by registering in advance, an owner is able to claim
statutory damages for any infringement that occurs after the regis-
tration. 6 "In cases where actual damage is difficult to prove, such
as where the violations are discovered before extensive damages are
caused, but the threat of such damage is large, statutory damages
can be useful in addition to attorney's fees to make the infringement
action worthwhile.""7
And fifth, "registration can cure publication with defective no-
tice, and avoid release of copyrighted work into the public do-
main.""8 This feature benefits the programmer who fails to place an
effective notice of the copyright,5 9 because if the mistake was inad-
vertent6' the registration will effectively cure any mistake which
51. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a).
52. DAVIDSON, at 111-112.
53. 17 U.S.C. § 412.
54. 17 U.S.C. § 410.
55. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a). NOTE: a party might nevertheless be able to bring a common
law copyright action if they fail to register.
56. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c).
57. DAVIDSON, at 112.
58. Id. See also 17 U.S.C. §§ 405-406.
59. See generally, 17 U.S.C. § 401, regarding "Notice of Copyright."
60. It is unclear if this applies to intentional omissions of notice "unless it was due to
[Vol. 4
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may have occurred in the previous five years.
What result occurs when the copyright is registered in the
name of someone who does not have the right of ownership? This
situation arises where an employee creates a program that can be
classified as a "work for hire," yet applies for registration and re-
ceives a certificate for the program. In Sawyer v. Crowel Publishing
Co.,61 the court held that a copyright, obtained by an employee for
work which was created in connection with his duties as an em-
ployee, is held in constructive trust by the employee for the em-
ployer. Therefore, if the work falls within the scope of the "works
made for hire" doctrine, certification acquired by the employee
would benefit the employer.
IX. APPLICATION To THE EMPLOYEE PROGRAMMER
Generally, the employer is given the initial rebuttable presump-
tion of copyright ownership pursuant to the "work made for hire"
doctrine.62 The best way for the employer to protect itself from
losing the benefit of an employee's compiled program, is through
the use of restrictive clauses in the employment contract.
The cost of litigation over copyright ownership clearly justifies
the creation of an express contract for employment for the em-
ployee-programmer. However, these agreements must be narrowly
and specifically tailored. If an agreement is over-broad, it may not
be enforceable.
Davidson lists four basic covenants for the employment con-
tract: 1) the duties of the employee; 2) a confidentiality clause; 3) a
covenant not to compete; and 4) an assignment of inventions.6 3 A
basic covenant in an employment agreement enumerating the em-
ployee's duties is useful when the employee attempts to assert own-
ership of a copyright the employer regards as a "work made for
hire."
The covenant regarding the duties of the employee should in-
clude a description of what is within the scope of the employee's
duties. The employer should retain the right to amend the contract
and change the duties without termination of the agreement, and
without execution of the contract, to allow flexibility in the use of
his employees.
mistaken legal advice." DAVIDSON, at 112; Innovative Concepts in Entertainment, Inc. v.
Entertainment Enter., 576 F. Supp. 475 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
61. 46 F. Supp. 471, 473 (3rd Cir. 1942).
62. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b).
63. Davidson, at 164-165.
1988]
COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
A confidentiality clause protects trade secrets rather than
works made for hire. Such an agreement would not block an em-
ployee from creating a new compilation or a derivative work based
upon information the employee obtained through work experi-
ence.' 4 However, confidentiality agreements are generally consid-
ered overreaching.65 Therefore, such covenants cannot defeat a
claim for infringement in situations where the offending work is a
new compilation or a derivative work.6
A covenant not to compete also concerns trade secret law
rather than copyright law. Covenants not to compete are prohib-
ited in several states including California, Michigan, and
Minnesota.'
An agreement to assign proprietary rights to the employer may
be included in an employment contract. For instance: "all works
which are copyrightable will be works made for hire within the
meaning of the 1976 Copyright Act," or "that the company will
own all legally recognized rights in any work product of the em-
ployee .... 68
An employer may also be protected through the registration
process. A "work made for hire" is presumed to give the copyright
to the employer. The employer should complete the registration
process as soon as practicable to protect the possibility of an in-
fringement by an employee.
In summary, while the employer may have the right to copy-
right all works made for hire, it is in their best interest to draft an
express employment agreement which the employer, the employer's
agent, and the employee all sign. The employer should then register
the copyright on all programs made for hire.69
In contrast, the employee or independent contractor should
have an attorney examine the employment agreement and deter-
64. See, eg., Structural Dynamics Research Corp. v. Engineering Mechanics Research
Corp., 401 F. Supp. 1102, 1111-1112 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
65. See e-g., Telex Corp. v. I.B.M., 367 F. Supp. 258, 315 (N.D. Ok. 1973), aff'd. in
part, rev'd. in part, 510 F.2d 894, 929 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. dism., 423 U.S. 802 (1975).
66. Id.
67. DAVIDSON, at 193.
68. DAVIDSON, at 196-197. See also 17 U.S.C. § 205 which states that the transfer of
the copyright must be registered. 17 U.S.C. § 203 states that all such transfers are theoreti-
cally reclaimable after thirty-five years. After this period of time, it is doubtful that the
software program would be of any value.
69. There are some practical considerations which may make an employment contract
containing such clauses undesirable. One such consideration is "team spirit." If the cove-
nants within the agreement are too restrictive upon the employees, they may feel that they are
working in a prison and quit. However, if the convenants are too broad, they will not be
effective.
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mine the ramifications of such an agreement on the copyrightable
works of the employee or the independent contractor.
The employee would naturally insist that the duties section of
the agreement be drawn as narrowly as possible. Work done
outside the scope or duties of employment should be clearly deline-
ated from "works made for hire."
The independent contractor may expressly reserve the right to
all copyrightable material. If the employer requires programs to
fulfill a definite need in the market, the independent contractor may
prefer to create the program at a reduced cost in exchange for either
a royalties agreement with the employer or an agreement to retain
ownership of the copyright. The availability of these options would
allow the programmers greater benefit from their works and avoid
costly litigation to both parties.
Because the employer's attorney usually draws up the employ-
ment agreement, the employee would be at a distinct disadvantage if
he does not seek independent counsel. Ideally, the employee should
be represented by counsel and participate in drafting the agreement.
A well-bargained agreement can be drafted to benefit both parties.
Although a court may strike clauses in the agreement for over-
breadth, the employee may be held to have signed away rights to
copyrightable material which do not fall within the scope of "works
made for hire."
Absent an employment agreement, the employee may rely on
both statutory and case law to determine copyright ownership. The
most favorable distinction is found in Siegel. In Siegel, the court
held that a modification of pre-existing work, at the instance and
expense of the employer, does not constitute a work created "within
the scope of employment" and is not "work made for hire." Thus,
an employee may create programs outside of the regular working
hours and adapt them to uses that the employer needs while retain-
ing ownership of those works.
In Collier, a former employee who created a new compilation
based upon knowledge and experience gained while in an employer-
employee relationship did not infringe the copyright. Making cop-
ies of programs that employees wrote for the employer may consti-
tute an infringement of the copyright in, for example, a basic input-
output program, though this is a very narrow exception. The em-
ployee may simply rewrite the program in another form or language
to avoid being sued for infringement.
The underlying idea of a program, or algorithm, has been de-
scribed as a "finite set of well-defined rules for the solution of a
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problem in a finite number of steps."7 The programmer may take
an idea and create his own program as long as the programmer does
not directly copy the source code or the object code of the existing
program. Any similarities may be attributed to the finite nature of
the algorithm.
An employee may argue, absent an express contractual agree-
ment to the contrary, that although the work was created while the
employment relationship existed it was not created at the instance
of the employer and thus is not a "work made for hire."71
If the employee is unsure as to whether or not a certain pro-
gram is covered by the "works made for hire" doctrine, the em-
ployee should register the copyright. If copyright litigation begins,
the employee will then have prima facie evidence of ownership via
the certificate, and the burden will shift to the employer to rebut
this evidence. But if a court decides that the program was covered
by the doctrine, the employee will be deemed to have held the certif-
icate in constructive trust for the employer.
Finally, the employee should keep copies of the source and ob-
ject code for all programs over which he has copyright protection.
These programs should include a correct notice of copyright and a
certificate of the copyright registration. The programmer should
also include some "peculiarities" within the program unrelated to
the algorithm such as a note concerning the function of certain
command lines, because once the program is compiled, the object
code will remain difficult to read or change. If a verbatim copy is
made, small peculiarities may be used as evidence that the expres-
sion was copied by the second party.
X. CONCLUSION
Arguably, the employee is at a disadvantage in most contrac-
tual negotiations with an employer. While it may not seem equita-
ble that the employer is presumed to own all "works made for
hire," there are certain economic considerations which justify this
position.
The employer provides the experience, compensation and tools
for the employee to create his works. The experience which the
employee receives prior to creating the program is paid for by the
employer. An employee who was able to create a program because
of his access to the employer's expensive P.C. might not have been
70. LINDSEY, ALEXANDER, LINDSEY ON ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE
ARTS, AGREEMENTS AND THE LAW, § 1918.
71. See eg., Siegel, supra, Scherr, supra, and Shapira, supra.
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able to do so otherwise because the employee would not have been
able to afford such a machine. Thus, the employer provides both
the means for the programmer to create as well as the need for the
program itself.
Finally, if the employer could not retain the ownership of
"works made for hire," it would not be economically beneficial for
him to have these works made only to loose them to a competitor
when the employee leaves.
While the employee is compensated for "works made for hire,"
he also avoids the expense and costs of marketing, registration, and
distribution.
The employee's position may not be as unequal to the em-
ployer's position as it may seem. The employee can refrain from
creating a marketable program until proper compensation is
received.
The employee-programmer also has the advantage of control-
ling the creative output. An employee may quit a job with an em-
ployer, then develop a software program inspired by the experience
and knowledge gained from work with the former employer, and
subsequently acquire ownership of the copyright. This scenario
places the employee in a strong bargaining position with the em-
ployer, thus justifying the restriction imposed by the "works made
for hire" doctrine from the 1976 Act.
The "works made for hire" doctrine of the 1976 Act fulfills the
purpose of Congressional power to enact such legislation because it
promotes the development of science and technology. If the "works
made for hire" doctrine was not included, many prospective pro-
grammers would not be given the experience, tools, or knowledge to
create useful developments.
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